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ABSTRACT
If information leakage occurs, an investigator is instructed to specify what documents were leaked and
who leaked them. In the present work, a distributed print-out monitoring system—which consists of a
virtual printer driver and print-out policy/log management servers—was developed. For easily
matching the discovered (i.e., leaked) paper document with the print-out log, the virtual printer driver
acquires full-text of printed-out documents by DDI hooking technique to check the content, transforms
a spool file to a picture file and creates both a thumbnail and text log for forensic investigation
afterwards. The log size is as only about 0.04 times bigger than that for printed-out electronic
documents, so the storage size needed for the thumbnail and text log is also small.
Keywords: Information leakage, Print-out, Digital forensics, Log, Virtual printer driver
1. INTRODUCTION
Information leakage is one of the most serious incidents facing a company or an organization. Many
leakage incidents happen in the form of documents. As for documents created in an office, it was
found that 93% are in electronic form and 7% are in paper form (Kevin 2000 [1]). However, 72.6% of
leakage routes are known to be via paper medium (JNSA 2010 [2]). In other words, although paper
documents make up a smaller percentage of the total amount of documents, they are the main cause of
information leakage. Since information-communication technology (ICT) is becoming ever more
common in all styles of working, these paper documents are considered to be those created in
electronic form first and then printed-out in paper form. Accordingly, the security of such print-out
matter is an important factor in preventing and detecting information leakage.
Once information leakage occurs, the company or organization starts incident response using digital
forensics. According to Takahashi 2008 [3], this response is composed of following steps.
1. Detection
2. Initial response
3. Investigation
4. Disclosures
5. Restraint and recovery
6. Post incident
From start to finish of this incident response, digital forensics is used to determine leakage facts such
as what documents were leaked and who leaked them.
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In the present work, a print-out monitoring system is in place that prevents illegal print-out according
to the content under usual working circumstances as well as supports digital forensics when
information leakage occurs. Moreover, this system is easy to install on existing PCs and requires less
storage size to accumulate the print-out logs.

2. DIGITAL FORENSIC SCENARIO CONCERNING INFORMATION LEAKAGE
2-1. Supposed information-leakage incident
Information-leakage incidents differ from one to another in terms of situation, impact, and so on. To
clarify situations and motivation concerning digital forensic, an incident such as that shown in Fig. 1 is
presented in this paper. This scenario is taken and modified from a report issued by the Tokyo
Metropolitan Police Department in 2010 [4].
Organization profile:
Employees in a given organization create and manage documents classified as state secrets
(such as materials containing international-terrorism-related data). The security administrator
imposes a strict security policy and audits employee’s working records four times a year.
Information-leakage incident:
One day, certain documents concerning a state secret were found in a book at a book store.
When an investigator checked the book, the state secret was found to be contained in a scanned
file of a printed-out document.
Digital-forensic purpose:
The investigator was instructed to specify what electronic documents were printed-out and who
made the print-out. If these facts were specified, the organization would be able to make the
appropriate lawful response.
Fig. 1: Supposed organization and information-leakage incident
2-2. Supposed document-management model
The organization must manage the documents properly and prevent information leakage. Typical
document-management models are classified as a central-management model or a distributed model.
2-2-1. Central-document-management model
The central-document-management model (see Fig. 2) is one of client-server models. Clients are
“dumb terminals,” which can only handle “KVM” (keyboard, video, and mouse) operations, i.e., not
storage. The servers are file servers and document-management servers. All documents created by
users are stored only on the server side, and any paper documents are printed out on the shared printer.
Any printed-out documents are therefore almost identical to the original one on the server side (see
broken arrow in Fig. 2).
If the information leakage mentioned in section 2-1 occurs, the investigator must collect and search
both the print-out logs at the shared printer and the documents on the server side (see unbroken arrow
in Fig. 2). These days, search engines are used widely on the server side, so they are useful for
supporting digital forensics.
The central-management model is ideal in regard to digital forensics because the investigator only has
to collect and search documents on the server side.
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Fig. 2: Central-document-management model
2-2-2. Distributed-document-management model
The distributed-document-management model (see Fig. 3) is a client-server model in which the clients
are PCs that can handle storage. The servers are the same as those in the central-documentmanagement model. The documents created by a user are stored on both the server side and the client
side. Any printed-out documents are thus almost identical to those on both the server side and the
client side (see broken arrow in Fig. 3).
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Fig. 3: Distributed-document-management model
If the information leakage mentioned in section 2-1 occurs, the investigator must collect and search the
print-out logs at the shared printer, the documents on the server side, and the documents on the client
side (see solid unbroken arrow in Fig. 3). In particular, the documents on the client side are sometimes
hard to investigate because many more PCs may exist on the client side than on the server side and
because not only complete versions of documents but also incomplete manuscripts in poor order exist.
The present study focused on the distributed-document-management model (Fig. 3) and especially
addresses collecting and searching the printed-out documents on the client side.
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By the way, it may be considered that the documents are transported electronically to an off-site
location (e.g., via flash drive or email) and then printed-out. In that case, the documents can be
protected by a conventional digital rights management (DRM) function [5][6]. By using the DRM,
print-out can be controlled from the central DRM server. But this DRM is only useful for delivering
the documents, not creating and modifying. So DRM is out of scope of the present study.
2-3. Digital-forensic techniques for print outs
Digital forensics includes many investigation procedures. To specify what electronic documents were
printed out and who did the printing out, the following procedure, shown schematically in Fig. 4 as
four steps, is used for digital-forensic investigations on Windows PCs. Note that Unix PCs or Mac PCs
can also be investigated using almost the same or alternative steps. However, Windows PCs are used
widely, so this study addresses information leakage with Windows PCs.
Step1: Check the registry key, such as “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SYSTEM/CurrentControlSet
/Control/Print/Printers.” If no printer driver is installed, the PC is judged to be not used for
print outs; that is, it is not suspected of information leakage.
Step2: Check the event log, such as event ID10, ID540, and ID560 (Microsoft’s Log Audit Guide
2007 [7]). If no print-out log is recorded, the PC is judged to be not used for print outs; that is,
it is not suspected of information leakage.
Step3: Check the spooler located at “C:/WINDOWS/system32/spool/PRINTERS”. If any residual
spool files are left, the investigator can match the printed-out image with the found paper
documents.
Step4: Check the documents listed in the print-out log so that the investigator can match the
documents with the discovered paper documents and specify when and where the document
was printed out and who printed it out.
Start
Check Registry Key
PC
PC

Use any Printers?

Registry

Yes

Investigator

Check Event Log

Event Log
Found
Paper
Documents

No

Spooler

Print out any
Documents?
Yes

Documents

Suspected

No

Not Suspected

Check Spooler
Note:
Match documents

Check Documents
End

Fig. 4: Digital forensic procedure for identifying printed-out documents with found paper documents.
2-4. Problems
The above-mentioned digital-forensic procedure for investigating print outs is sometimes useful, but it
suffers the following residual problems.
Problems 1: Uncertainty regarding what documents were printed out.
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The Windows event log records “print job name”, which depends on each print-out application and
often includes only the file name, not the file path. The investigator thus cannot always match what
documents were printed-out with the discovered paper document, even if the investigator knows the
print job name. Moreover, spool files are deleted after succeeding print outs and overwritten one by
one. Recovering the spool files is therefore difficult.
Problems 2: It takes a lot of time to collect and confirm the registry, event log, and spool file.
The number of client PCs exceeds that of servers, and the PCs are distributed in a variety of places.
Moreover, access to the registry, event log, and spool file needs an administrator privilege for each
PC. Consequently, acquiring the registry, event log and spool file data takes more time to collect and
confirm.
3. DESIGN OF THE DISTRIBUTED PRINT-OUT MONITORING SYSTEM
To solve the problems described in section 2-4, a distributed print-out monitoring system was
designed and constructed.
3-1. Operational model
When an employee needs to print out a document, he (or she) must install the printer driver of the
shared printer. The printer driver is often provided by the print server. Even if PCs are distributed in a
variety of places, the printer driver can be managed by the print server. The monitoring system was
designed with a focus on the printer driver. Moreover, the supposed organization has a strict security
policy, so the monitoring system is also equipped with a print-out control function that benefits both
users and security administrators. The design of the operational model is shown schematically in Fig.
5.
User 1

User 2

PC
PC
Virtual Printer
Driver

PC
PC
Virtual Printer
Driver

Documents

Documents

Security Administrator

User N

・・・

Print-Out-Policy
Management
Server

Note:

PC
PC
Virtual Printer
Driver

Print Server

Documents

Virtual Printer
Driver

Print-Out-Log
Management
Server

New Component

Paper
Documents
Shared
Printer

Found
Paper
Documents

Investigator

Fig. 5: Operational model of distributed print-out monitoring system
Users perform their business as following:
(1) Users install a virtual printer driver from the print server on each PC.
(2) Connected with the print-out-policy management server, the virtual printer driver checks the printout content and controls the print jobs on each PC.
(3) The virtual printer driver acquires the print-out logs and sends them to the print-out-log
management server.
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If an information leakage occurs:
(4) The investigator searches the print-out logs to match a log entry with the leaked paper document.
3-2. Print-out logs
The print-out log is the key to match the log with the found paper documents. The print-out log
consists of three items: (1) a spool file itself, (2) a picture file (transformed from (1)), and (3) a spool
file acquired as text. These items are compared in Table 1.
The spool file, item (1), itself is sure to match the leaked paper document, but it needs to be re-printed
out. The picture file, item (2), is easy to match with the leaked paper document without having to be
re-printed out. However, its file size is prone to be big, and optical character recognition (OCR) is not
always accurate in the case of text search. The text file, item (3), is easy to search, and the file size
tends to be small. However, figures, pictures, and document layout are dropped from item (3).
To find interesting logs in a large amount of print-out logs, item (3) (text) is useful. On the other hand,
to match the leaked document, (1) (spool file) or (2) (picture file) is useful. Accordingly, the print-out
log was selected to be hybrid, both a picture file and text. Moreover, the picture file was selected to be
thumbnails of all the pages of the printed-out document.
Table 1: Comparison of print-out-log items (1), (2), and (3)
Items

(1) Spool file

(2) Picture file

(3) Text

Examples

RAW, EMF, XPS, PS

JPG, PNG etc.

TXT

Match with leaked
paper document

Easy

Easy

Not always easy
(figures, pictures, and
layout are dropped)

Need to re-print-out

Yes

No

No

Log file size

Prone to be big

Prone to be big

Tends to be small

Find an interesting
log

Need to find by eye

OCR can be used to
extract text (but prone
to be incorrect)

Easy to text search.

The print-out-log format and its supposed size are listed in Table 2.
Table 2: Print-out log format
Items

Description

Supposed size

Date

Year, month, day, hour, minutes, seconds

14 bytes

User

Username

≤20 bytes

Printer

Printer name

≤32 bytes

Print job name

Print-job name (depends on print-out
application)

≤255 bytes (possibly)

Page number

Number of printed-out pages

≤4 bytes

Content

Thumbnail

Thumbnails of each page

Depends on documents

Text

Full text of all pages

Depends on documents

114

ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2011
3-3. Print-out control
The print job is a key to control printing out documents. However, the print job itself is hard to check
according to its content. Accordingly, it was decided to extract text information stored on the virtual
printer driver, to check its content of text information, and to allow or prohibit the print job to send to
the shared printer. Extracting text information from the text print-out log is described in section 3-2.
Checking text typically follows two strategies: (1) index search and (2) GREP search. These strategies
are compared in Table 3. Index search is fast but not accurate; that is, precision and recall rate
(Ricardo et al. 1999 [8]) is not always 100%. In detail, precision rate means the fraction of retrieved
documents that are relevant to the search, and recall rate means the fraction of the documents that are
relevant to the query that are successfully retrieved. In contrast GREP search is accurate; that is, recall
rate is always 100%, but speed is low. From the viewpoint of checking text, precision below 100% is
allowed but recall rate below 100% is never allowed because of the possibility of missing the
interesting print-out logs. Strategy (2) (GREP search) was thus chosen for checking text.
Table 3: Comparison of strategies for checking text
Strategy

(1) Index search

(2) GREP search

Search speed

Fast

Slow

Spare resource
before search

Indexing time and storage space for
index files are needed.

Spare time and storage are not
needed.

Precision

≤ 100%

≤ 100%

Recall

≤ 100%

Always equals 100%

Examples of the GREP search keywords are listed in Table 4. These keywords are set by the security
administrator on the print-out policy-management server. Alternatively, the investigator may set them
on print-out-log management server when performing GREP search of the print-out logs.
Table 4: Examples of keywords
Category

Keywords sample

Confidential

“Confidential”, “Do not print”, “Internal use only”, etc.

Customer

Customer name (depends on each organization or business), credit-card
numbers (often expressed by regular expression), etc.
3-4. Digital forensic use

When the investigator uses the distributed print-out monitoring system (Fig. 5), the following
procedure is followed step by step.
Step1: Extract characteristic keywords in the leaked paper document
Step2: Perform GREP search for the print-out logs containing those keywords
Step3: Check the thumbnail pictures matched by the keywords, then match the thumbnails with the
leaked paper documents.
Step4: Determine when the document was printed out (according to the print-out logs) and who did
the printing.
By following this procedure, even if the client PCs are distributed widely, the investigator can collect
print-out logs and search them accurately and efficiently. This procedure thus solves the problems
stated in section 2-4.
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4. IMPLEMENTATION OF VIRTUAL PRINTER DRIVER
4-1. Basic function of printer driver
A printer driver is a program (called by a print-out application) that sends a print job to a printer
(Microsoft Developer Network 2010 [9]). The process followed by the printer driver is typically
classified as two processes: layout arrangement and character output. Layout arrangement determines
how many pages are needed and where to arrange characters and figures, etc. in the pages. Character
output determines font, size, color, and decoration of the characters. Especially, the characters
included in an electronic document are used as the input of the character-output process (see Fig. 6).
For example, “a” is expressed by the character code “U+0061” in an electronic document. The
character-output process transforms the code “U+0061” to the shape of “a”.
Printer Driver
Print-Out
Application

Documents

Acquire
Code of
Characters

Transform
to Shape of
Characters

U+0061

“a”

U+0062

“b”

U+0063

“c”

・・・

・・・

Output to
Printer
Language

Shared
Printer

Paper
Documents

Fig. 6: Outline of character-output processing
4-2. Virtual printer driver
The virtual printer driver is a key component of the distributed print-out monitoring system. It is
generally called a print-out application and sends a print job as a bitmap file, which can be printed out
by a real printer driver of any kind. The architecture of the virtual printer driver is shown in Fig. 7.
When a character code is acquired, a DDI (device-driver-interface) hooking technique (Microsoft
Developer Network 2010 [10]) modifies the acquisition process and transforms the characters into
Unicode character code. All the characters are connected to be full-text and the full-text is then
checked by the GREP search. If any NG keywords are included, the print job is deleted and the print
out is stopped. If no NG keywords are included, both a text log and a thumbnail log are created and
sent to the print-out-log management server.
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Note:
DDI: Device Driver Interface
GREP: Global Regular Expression Print
PC
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Output to
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Real Printer
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GREP Search

From Print-Out-Policy
Management Server

To Print-Out-Log
Management Server

Fig. 7: Architecture of virtual printer driver
4-3. DDI hooking
The virtual printer driver was implemented on Windows XP SP3. The pseudo-code is shown in Fig. 8.
The document print-out process begins with a DrvStartDoc call and ends with a DrvEndDoc call. For
each physical page, the page-print-out process begins with a DrvStartPage call and ends with a
DrvSendPage call. Between the DrvStartPage call and the DrvSendPage call, rendering operations and
DrvTextOut are called as needed.
DDI hooking is provided by the Windows OS. By using that, the developer can refer or modify many
kinds of the print-out control information. By hooking the DrvTextOut call, all characters code can be
acquired. The hooking process is shown schematically in Fig. 8.
Original Code

DDI Hooking Code Added

DrvStartDoc
For each physical page {
DrvStartPage {
Rendering operations;
DrvTextOut;

Get Policy from Print-Out-Policy Management Server.

}

Acquire code of characters, transform it to Unicode character code and make up
full text.

DrvSendPage

Acquire thumbnail picture of each page.

}
DrvEndDoc

Check the full-text by GREP search. If includes NG words then delete print job.
Send text log and thumbnail log to Print-Out Log-Management Server

Fig. 8: Pseudo-code with DDI hooking process added
An example of a print-out log is shown in Fig. 9. The thumbnail picture is set as a JPEG file with a
size of 181 × 256 pixels because the thumbnail picture included in the XPS file has the same
specification (Microsoft 2010 [11]).
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Text Log (in Japanese)
Print-out Target
(Electronic Document)

（電子協標準パターンＪ６／Ｖｅｒ．１） プリンタの市場予測 本調査の概要 プリンタ市場の今後の動向を把
握するために,従来から当協会ではプリンタ市場の予測を行ってきたが,急激な市場の変化にともない海外生
産が増大し，また海外メーカーのシェアが高まり，全世界市場動向からのずれが見られるようになってきた。
このため当協会では，メンバー各社の協力を得て，今回新たな方法で大多数を占めるパソコン市場に焦点を
あてプリンタの方式別に出荷数量，金額の予測を試みた。具体的には，予測をしていく上で出発点となる昨
年度の実績評価をまず充分に行い，各年の伸び率を想定していくことで市場規模の予測を進めた。 今回予
測に関しては世界市場で行ったが，実績については北米，欧州，アジアパシフィック（日本を除くアジア，オセ
アニア地域），日本，その他（中近東，中南北米欧州日本ｱｼﾞｱ/ﾊﾟｼﾌｨｯｸその他ドットマトリクスサーマルイン
クジェット電子写真ＭＦＰ01,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,000(千台)米，ロシア他）の各地域市場毎に把握
できるように配慮し，さらに今後の新分野となるであろうＭＦＰ（当委員会は，プリンタをベースとしたローエン
ドの複合機のみを対象とした）についての予測も試みた。なお，数量，金額，それぞれの実績推定値および
予測値は，メーカー出荷時点の値を想定している。 Worldwide方式別プリンター市場規模予測 (単位:千台､
百万円) 実績(推定値) 予
測 昨 年 度 今 年 度 １ 年 後 ２ 年 後 ３ 年 後 ４ 年 後 台数
金額 台数 金額 台数 金額 台数 金額 台数 金額 台数 金額 ﾄﾞｯﾄﾏﾄﾘｸｽ 11,214 292,010 8,889 249,278 7,654
211,588 6,506 173,303 5,853 149,532 5,266 129,150 前年比 79% 85% 86% 85% 85% 82% 90% 86% 90% 86%
ｻｰﾏﾙ 345 48,844 273 57,961 246 53,787 244 50,027 238 44,544 233 39,665 前年比 79% 119% 90% 93%
99% 93% 98% 89% 98% 89% ｲﾝｸｼﾞｪｯﾄ 8,620 241,140 14,323 399,448 20,587 622,383 25,913 739,843 29,979
779,102 34,158 804,611 前年比 166% 166% 144% 156% 126% 119% 116% 105% 114% 103% 電子写真 6,438
436,484 6,780 420,392 7,707 479,960 8,659 510,036 9,314 517,400 10,071 535,042 前年比 105% 96% 114%
114% 112% 106% 108% 101% 108% 103% MFP 7 1,890 32 2,129 295 15,033 442 20,294 663 27,397 995 36,986
前年比 457% 113% 922% 706% 150% 135% 150% 135% 150% 135% 合 計 26,624 1,020,360 30,297 1,129,200
36,489 1,382,751 41,764 1,493,503 46,047 1,517,975 50,723 1,545,454 前年比 114% 111% 120% 122% 114%
108% 110% 102% 110% 102%
今年度の地域別／方式別プリンタ出荷台数

Thumbnail Log
JPEG File
181 x 256 Pixel

Fig. 9: Example print-out logs
4-4. Searching Japanese text
English and Japanese differ in that English sentences have blanks between words to distinguish each
word and that Japanese does not separate words with blanks. Chinese and Korean have the same
characteristics as Japanese. So a GREP search is prone to be slower in the cases of Japanese, Chinese,
and Korean. To distinguish every word, morphological-analysis tools [12][13][14] are known to be
useful. Using both the GREP search and morphological-analysis tools is one way to search Japanese
text.
By using the morphological-analysis tools, the full-text is divided into each word. Especially the noun
words tend to be divided exactly. Many keywords are usually noun words, so the tools influence little
on search leakage.
5. EVALUATION OF PRINT-OUT LOG SIZE
The print-out log is better if its size is smaller. The following evaluation addresses the size of the
print-put log.
5-1. Precondition
Print-out log size depends on the target electronic documents. To standardize the evaluation, standardtest-patterns for printers were used (JEITA 2003 [15]). In Fig. 9, one of the test patterns is shown.
These test patterns are as follows.
z

File formats are Microsoft Word 97, Excel 97, Power Point 97, and so on.

z

Characters, graphs, pictures, tables, figures, images, and so on are included.

z

Page numbers are from 1 to 12 pages only.

z

Both monochrome and color documents are included.

To compare the print-out log size of different logs, the following two kinds of logs were chosen from
Table 1.
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z

Size of spool file

z

Size of both thumbnail and text log (shown in Table 2)
5-2. Evaluation result

5-2-1. Size of spool file

File size of print-out spoolfiles (KB )

The spool-file formats were RAW, EMF, XPS, and PS. The standard-test-patterns were printed-out by
a RAW printer driver, an EMF printer driver, a XPS printer driver, and a PS printer driver. Average of
their spool-file sizes was then calculated. The calculation results are shown in Fig. 10. The relationship
between standard-test-pattern size and average spool-file size is almost proportional. The average
spool-file size is as about 1.85 times bigger than that of the standard-test-patterns.
100000

y = 1.8489x + 389.04
R 2 = 0.9258

10000

R A W spoolfile
EM F spoolfile
XP S spoolfile
P S spoolfile
A verage
Linearization (A verage)

1000

100

10
10

100

1000

10000

File size of electronic doccum ents (KB )

Fig. 10: Average size of spool files (RAW, EMF, XPS, and PS)
5-2-2. Size of thumbnail and text log
Total size of the log is the thumbnail log size plus the text log size. The standard-test-patterns are
printed out by the virtual printer driver described in section 4.2. Two kinds of log sizes were then
added. The result is shown in Fig. 11. The total size is as about 0.04 times bigger than that of the
standard-test-patterns.
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Fig. 11: Total size of thumbnail and Text Logs.
5-3. Application to typical office
The required storage size was estimated for the office supposed as follows.
z

30 employees share 1 printer

z

Each employee print outs 3000 pages per year

z

Average printed-out electronic document size is 1 MB

If the print-out log is a spool file, the estimated size is 201.4 GB per year. If the print-out log is a
thumbnail and text log, the estimated size is 5.2 GB per year. In other words, the thumbnail and text
log size decreases by 97.4% compared to the spool file. This means that only 2.6% of the storage
space is needed in the case of the thumbnail and text log compared to the spool file.

6. RELATED WORKS
(1) Print-out logs
Related print-out forensic work have been done on print servers (Canon, 2008 [16] and Ricoh, 2008
[17]). The print servers acquire text information from the print jobs and put the print-out records in
storage. In another research (Fujii, 2010 [18]) text information is acquired by EMF spool file. This
work demonstrated a virtual printer driver that acquires text information. The virtual printer driver is
faster in acquiring text information than the work on the print servers.
(2) Watermark print
Watermark print outs have also been researched (Ono, 2004 [19]). A watermark, which includes date,
username, and filename, is printed out on paper documents. If a paper document was leaked, the
watermark can be extracted by scanning, and the investigator can determine the date, username, and
filename. A watermark print is thus useful only after an information leakage; in contrast, the
distributed print-out monitoring system developed in the present work is useful not only after a
leakage but also for daily control and periodical auditing.

7. CONCLUSION

120

ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2011
A distributed print-out monitoring system—composed of a virtual printer driver and a print-out
policy/log management server—was developed. The virtual printer driver acquires text information by
DDI hooking, performs GREP search to check the content, and creates a thumbnail and text log. The
log size is about 0.04 times bigger than as that of printed-out electronic files. That is, compared to the
storage size required for retrieving a print-out log as a spool file, the required storage size for the
virtual driver is 97.4% smaller. In our future work, we will address the challenge of confirming the
actual usefulness of the system for forensic investigation after information leakage.
Windows, Windows XP, Microsoft Word, Excel, and PowerPoint are registered trademarks of
Microsoft Corporation in the United States and/or other countries.
Unix is a registered trademark of The Open Group in the United States and other countries.
Mac is a registered trademark of Apple Computer, Inc., in the United States and other countries.
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